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H eadline grabbing events like the denial of service attacks1 on "dot com" companies2 in early 2000 and the excitement over 1999's Y2K fears3 
have served to tum public and governmental attention to the vulnerability of 
computers in an increasingly network-dependent, infonnation-oriented 
society. For their part, militaries-and especially the US anned forces-have 
for some time been grappling with the implications of the metamorphosis 
spawned by the enonnous advances in computer technologies of the last 
twenty years. A general consensus exists that emerging digital capabilities are 
stimulating what is popularly known as a "Revolution in Military Affairs," or 
RMA.4 There are many aspects to the RMA,5 but few would dispute that one 
progeny is the rise of infonnation operations (10)6 as a specific military 
discipline. 
In fact, the threat of cyberattack as a fonn ofrO is a major concern of the 
US anned forces. In its doctrine, the military gives the defense of infonnation 
systems open and prominent attention.7 In military circles, 10 is viewed as 
an asymmetric strategy because it presents an opportunity for an adversary 
with a narrow capability to successfully strike a seemingly more powerful 
opponent like the United States. One commentator eA-plains this phenomena 
as follows: 
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No other country or group can approach the US conventional-weapon 
superiority. This is why many terrorists find information terrorism an attractive 
alternative to traditional forms of terrorism. eyber-terrorism allows 
terrorists-both foreign and domestic-to inflict damage with no harm to 
themselves and litde chance of being caught. It is a way for the "weak" to attack 
the "strong," particularly to disrupt a stronger force at a key time during an 
operation.8 
The threat of cyberterrorism as a form ofIO is especially troublesome to the 
US armed forces because it can strike at vital systems not under military control. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has officially acknowledged that today it is 
"dependent upon non-DoD assets-the international and national infrastruc-
tures, [and] other facilities and services of the private sector,"9 and these could be 
targets of cyberattacks. The Air Force admits that this "Achilles' heel of the 
United States can be the great equalizer for a militarily inferior adversary."10 
Still, "cyberterrorism" as a term of art does not, per se, find a home in the 
Pentagon's lexicon.11 "Terrorism," however, is e}..1'licitly defined. The DoD 
describes it as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful vio-
lence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or soci-
eties in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological."12 Cyberterrorism might therefore be understood as using digital 
technologies to achieve the aims of traditional terrorism. 
The purpose of this essay is to briefly outline the military's response to the 
threat of cyberterrorism, and to examine some of the emerging policy issues at-
tendant to that response. In addition, I will discuss a few issues associated \vith 
using the tools of the cyberterrorist against America's enemies, and the complica-
tions that doing so presents to democratic societies. In addressing both these per-
spectives, I will be more concerned with identifying areas for further study than 
with presenting refined solutions. Having said that, I will attempt to anchor the 
discussion wherever possible in the context of American democracy and how it 
should shape the role of the military in addressing the dangers of cyberterrorism. 
The Military Response 
For at least five years, uniformed leaders have publicly discussed the vulnera-
bility to cyberattack on the digital networks upon which the military relies.13 
Yet according to policy in place since 1995, the responsibility for the security of 
critical non-DoD "information systems and computer-based systems and net-
works that can be distributive in nature" remains with civilianIaw enforcement 
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authorities.14 Nevertheless, the DoD "must be prepared, in concert with the 
appropriate authorities and within defense priorities, to assist in their protec-
tion" if the attack on the systems "seriously degrades or threatens DoD opera-
tions."15 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, issued in May of1998, 16 provides 
a conceptual basis to e:h.-pand DoD's responsibility. In that document DoD was 
designated as the "lead agency" in the area of "national defense" with responsi-
bility for "coordinating all of the activities of the United States Government in 
that area."17 PDD 63, however, left the scope of "national defense" undefined. 
In addition, PDD 63 established the National Infrastructure Protection Center 
(NIPC), an organization physically located within the Federal Bureau ofInves-
tigation (FBI).18 NIPC brings DoD together with "representatives from the 
FBI, other US government agencies, state and local governments, and the pri-
vate sector."19 NIPC also serves as the US Government's "focal point for threat 
assessment, warning, investigation, and response for threats or attacks against our 
critical infrastructures. "20 
Paralleling these developments, the individual military services have taken 
steps to enhance defenses against cyberattacks. In 1993 the Air Force established 
the Air Force Information Warfare Center with the explicit mission of protect-
ing friendly command and control systems.21 The other services have likewise 
planned to confront a cyberadversary.22 Further, the National Security Agency 
(NSA), an element of the Department of Defense, is tasked with an "informa-
tion assurance mission."23 In executing that mission, NSA "conducts defensive 
information operations, to achieve information assurance for information infra-
structures critical to US national security interests." 24 
In order to further coordinate the military response,Joint Task Force Com-
puter Network Defense OTF-CND) was formed in early 199925 with a charter 
to orchestrate the protection of all DoD computer systems.26 In a move to 
bolster its effectiveness,JTF-CND was placed under the control of US Space 
Command (USSPACECOM) in October of 1999.27 At the same time, the 
Joint Information Operations Center was placed under SP ACECOM control. 28 
In another effort to increase its resources against cyberattack, the Defense Com-
puter Forensics Lab was established in September 1999.29 It aims to facilitate, 
among other things, the tracing across the Internet of hackers who threaten DoD 
systems.30 
Finally, Joint Task Force-Civil Support GTF-CS), an organization assigned 
to US Joint Forces Command, was established not to defend DoD systems per se, 
but to assist civilian authorities in managing the consequences of any catastrophic 
act of terrorism, including cyberterrorism. In announcing the new task force, 
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DoD conceded that the benign title of "civil support" and the selection of a Na-
tional Guardsman instead of a Regular officer as the commander were both in-
tended to quell the concerns of civil libertarians who feared that the "DoD was 
out to take over and would trample people's civil liberties" with the new organi-
zation.31 
Although the armed forces were quietly developing an offensive 10 capabil-
ity for some time, it has only recently been discussed openly. Offensive 10 
embodies activities such as "operations security, military deception, psycho-
logical operations, electronic warfare, physical destruction and special infor-
mation operations, and could include computer network attack."32 These 
types of operations present a plethora of complex legal issues, and practical 
problems as well. DoD has admitted to Congress that during Operation 
ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo "the conduct of integrated information opera-
tions was hampered by the lack of advance planning and necessary strategic 
guidance."33 In order to better focus the offensive information operations ef-
fort, General Richard Meyers, the commander of USSPACECOM, an-
nounced in January 2000 that effective October 1, 2000 the command will 
"pick up the computer network attack mission."34 
The Emerging Policy Issues 
Clearly, the US military aims to protect itself against cyberterrorism, facilitate 
a broader defense of US interests against that threat, and employ cyber-
technology as a means and method of warfare, albeit for a presumably more 
righteous purpose than the cyberterrorist. What kind of policy issues should we 
expect to see? 
Background 
Before considering the specific issues associated with the role of the military 
in defending against cyberattacks, it is important to understand that in the US 
there is a generally accepted division oflabor on security issues. As a rule, civilian 
law enforcement agencies handle internal security, while the primary purpose of 
the military is, as the Supreme Court put it in Totlt v. Quarles, "to fight or be 
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise"-ordinarily an extemally focused 
endeavor.35 The tradition of ordinarily excluding the military from performing 
policing duties is traceable to the Founding Father's deep-seated suspicion of 
professional militaries.36 That suspicion resulted from their cognizance of the 
excesses of Cromwell' s New Model Army in England, as well as their loathing of 
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British regulars used to suppress the colonists' growing protests against imperial 
rule. For these and other reasons, the scheme for national security found in the 
Constitution principally contemplates not the large standing forces we have to-
day, but a rather small number of regulars augmented by huge state militias.37 In 
short, in practical terms it is doubtful that the Founding Fathers ever envisioned 
a standing anny large enough to function as any kind of police force on a reguJ.ar 
basis. 
While the US military has been used successfully from time to time to quell 
civil disorders that overwhelm civilian resources, the record of the relatively few 
times it has been used for an extended period for a law enforcement-type mis-
sion is less than sanguine. Indeed, it was the intemperate behavior of Federal oc-
cupation troops during the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era that led to the 
passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878.38 The Act-which criminalizes the 
use of the military to enforce the law absent specific authority-remains the 
principle limitation on the employment of the anned forces for internal security 
purposes. 
Of course, the Posse Comitatus Act is not intended to frustrate the military's 
ability to engage in bona fide national security-related activities. Exacdy what 
constitutes a national security activity appropriate for military attention, how-
ever, became blurred during the Cold War, and especially during the domestic 
unrest of the Vietnam era. The result was an unwholesome involvement of the 
military establishment in the personal affairs of thousands oflaw-abiding US citi-
zens. Professor LochJohnson reports, for example, that "NSA computers were 
fed every single cable sent overseas by Americans from 1947 until 1975 [and] 
Anny intelligence units conducted investigations against 100,000 Americans 
during the Vietnam War. "39 
The excesses of military and civilian intelligence agencies during this period 
led to Senate investigations in the 1970s (the Church Committee)40 and sub-
stantial restrictions on the ability of military organizations to scrutinize US citi-
zens.41 Nevertheless, by the early 1980s the nation's drug crisis led Congress to 
enact a number of measures to involve the military in efforts to halt the tide of 
narcotics flowing into the country and to help stem the crime explosion cata-
lyzed by illicit drugs.42 While the anned forces are still generally prohibited 
from such activities as conducting searches and seizures and effecting arrests, the 
military counterdrug effort-especially in technical support and border surveil-
lance activities-amounts to billions of dollars and involves thousands of uni-
fonned personnel. 
As a result of such initiatives, the traditional reluctance to employ the military 
in a domestic security role appears to be eroding. 43 Regrettably, however, 
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incidents occur that demonstrate that the skills of the soldier are not necessarily 
coterminous with those of the policeman. For example, the tragic 1997 shooting 
of a Texas high school sophomore by a Marine Corps border surveillance patrol 
may well illustrate that the orientation of the armed forces leads its members to 
deal with perceived threats differendy than do law enforcement personne1.44 
This difference produces a very distinct approach to security problems. 
As a general rule, soldiers move on threats by fire and maneuver with a view 
towards permanendy eliminating them; police forces attach the presumption of 
innocence towards suspected lawbreakers and seek to resolve incidents peace-
fully with the ultimate disposition left to the courts. It should be no surprise, 
therefore-given the military's perspective-that a Pentagon-sponsored report 
argued that the Pentagon's "policy of prohibiting DoD from mounting a coun-
ter cyberattack if its computers are attacked puts the military at risk."45 In re-
sponding to the report's proposal to allow the military to immediately launch a 
counterattack, John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists quipped, 
"Does this mfXUl that the Pentagon will start frying the home PCs of American 
teen-age hackers?" 
According to a 1999 Harris poll,46 the armed forces enjoy a status as the most 
trusted institution in American society. In my opinion, few activities could 
jeopardize that trust more than an increased involvement in law enforcement 
and related activities that cause military personnel to intrude into the lives of ev-
eryday Americans. It would not seem to make sense, therefore, to involve mili-
tary personnel in controversial proposals such as the Federal Intrusion Detection 
Network (FIDNET). 47 In an era when the US remains obliged by world events 
to maintain a still sizeable military establishment, and one that is now an 
all-volunteer professional force, the maintenance of harmonious civil-military 
relations ought to be a prime concern of democratic leaders. This is especially so 
given the troubling reports of a growing estrangement of the US armed forces 
from the nation it serves, notwithstanding the public's evident affection for 
those in uniform.48 
Defending Against Cyberthreats 
These lessons of the past are worth considering as we develop policies on 
the military's role in fighting cyberterrorism. Most experts agree that the nature 
of cyberterrorism is such that it is extremely difficult-at least initially and often 
later, if ever-to distinguish between the teenage hacker on a digital joy ride, 
the high-tech felon on a crime spree, the non-State cyberfanatics seeking to 
intimidate, and the nation-State waging information warfare. Moreover, 
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the clever cyberterrorist can often employ techniques that make it appear 
that innocent parties are the instigators of whatever chaos they manage to 
wreak. Thus, a military organization involved in investigating an attempted act 
of cyberterrorism could well find itself mistakenly probing innocent persons. 
Even when the guilty party is correcdy identified, it may often be one more 
properly falling within the jurisdiction of a law enforcement agency, not a mili-
tary force. 
Consequendy, the current policy that assumes-at the outset anyway-that 
an act of cyberterrorism is a criminal matter subject to law enforcement modali-
ties as opposed to a hostile attack calling for a response by the armed forces seems 
appropriate. Moreover, military leaders-to include former Deputy Secretary 
of Defense John Hamre-have repeatedly emphasized that DoD is not seeking 
an active role in law enforcement in response to the terrorist threat.49 Still, rela-
tive to the military, police resources are limited and diffused over thousands of 
jurisdictions. While this state of affairs may be satisfactory in the context of ordi-
nary crime fighting requirements, it may be unacceptable if cyberterrorism pres-
ents a threat of truly catastrophic dimensions as some have claimed. 
The magnitude of the cyberthreat has much to do with the appropriateness of 
a military response. A recent study50 of the Posse Comitatus Act in relation to 
the protection of military and civil infrastructure against digital attack concluded 
that the military may conduct what might otherwise be considered prohibited 
law enforcement activities under certain circumstances. Specifically, action 
against civilians consistent with the act can occur when, inter alia, an "emer-
gency" exists or when the activity is primarily in pursuit of a "military pur-
pose. "51 Accordingly, "if the primary purpose of an action is to resolve or avert a 
problem with a strong tie to national security, the military purpose exception [to 
the Posse Comitatus Act] may be invoked."52 
This brings us almost full circle to the central issue: when does cyberterrorism 
rise to the level of a true national security threat? We seem to accept almost 
\vithout question the assertion that the US is "extraordinarily vulnerable" and 
that "an enemy could systematically disrupt banking, transportation, utilities, 
finance, government functions and defense."53 To listen to many pundits, the 
US is virtually at the mercy of any teenager with a Radio Shack computer. The 
reality, I contend, is much different. Specifically, I believe that cyber-
terrorism-particularly when conceived exclusively in terms of computer net-
work attack intended to cripple the nation's economy or military forces-is 
much more difficult to accomplish. 
To put it blundy, if cyberterrorism were so easy and cheap to do, why have 
we not seen a catastrophic event? If not in the US, anywhere? This is much the 
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same point that Rand analyst and cyberwar expert Martin Libido wrote about in 
Foreign Policy. 54 In this regard, I think it would be a mistake to make too much of 
the past denial-of-service attacks on commercial sites. In the first place, most 
sites were impeded for only a short time, leading many experts to characterize 
the incidents as "little more than criminal mischie£"55 Ironically, the attacks 
may have caused little revenue loss. Newsweek wryly noted that since" dot-coms 
typically lose money on every sale they make, they might come out ahead" as a 
result of the attacks. 56 
As Libicki observes, there is a great difference between public commercial 
websites, and the sensitive military and civilian infrastructure operating systems 
whose incapacitation on a grand scale might stagger even a country like the 
United States. However vulnerable the former, the latter are much more secure 
and, in any event, often operate in a dosed loop, independent mode requiring 
unique expertise even if access is somehow achieved. This is a key reason why, 
for example, Bruce F. Wollenberg, a professor of electrical engineering at the 
University of Minnesota, insists that the US power grid "isn't hacker friendly. "57 
Dan Kuehl, a respected professor at the National Defense University, argues 
that the reason a full-fledged cyberattack has not been launched is "solely be-
cause no state or non-nation state actor has yet seen sufficient strategic advantage 
to be gained by doing so-and this condition will not last indefinitely."58 I dis-
agree because I believe the requisite e:lq)ertise is much rarer than many assume, 
and much of that e}"'Pertise is on the side of the good guys. We live in a world of 
Saddam Husseins, Slobodan Milosevics, and Osama bin Ladens, who are 
hell-bent to inflict harm upon us in any way they can. These are people to whom 
the logic of "strategic advantage" is e}"'Pressed in the most savage acts of terror 
they can manage to accomplish. They are smart, ruthless, moneyed, and moti-
vated, yet have not achieved a crushing cyberassault. 
We tend to discount too readily our own defensive capabilities. Recall that 
much was made of the supposed "hacker" capabilities of the allegedly com-
puter-literate Serbs and others during the Kosovo campaign. Evidently, they 
tried hard. According to Lieutenant General William J. Donahue, "hackers 
came at us daily, hell-bent on taking down NATO networks."59 Yet, the end 
result was failure: no NATO combat deaths, and a near-zero effect on the ulti-
mate military outcome. Similarly, despite all the allegations of rampant, damag-
ing attacks in the private sector, the reality is that the US economy continues to 
roar. Are we to believe that there are thousands of malicious people ,vith diverse 
agendas at scores oflocations around the globe fully capable of devastating us 
with keystrokes who are collectively refraining from doing so because of some 
serendipitously uniform appraisal of "strategic advantage"? My assessment of 
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human nature leads me to conclude otherwise. In short, they "would if they 
could-but they calt't." 
Let me emphasize that I certainly do not counsel indifference; I recognize that 
cyberattacks will succeed occasionally. Collectively, they are cosdy-$7.6 bil-
lion in 1999 by one estimate.60 Thus, I think the Clinton Administration's pro-
posal to spend some $2 billion on various computer security programs is a 
prudent and affordable insurance policy for the nation.61 I merely point out that as 
sizeable as the estimated cyber losses are, they must be understood in the context of 
a country that each year suffers more than $150 billion in costs from motor vehicle 
crashes alone62-not to mention over 40,000 deaths, and in excess of 6 million in-
jured.63 I simply caution that we should not unnecessarily divert resources from 
other pressing needs based on what may be an mistaken analysis of the threat. 
Moreover, in calculating the dimensions of our potential cyberterrorism 
problem we should not underestimate the power of our capitalistic free market 
system to find solutions. In a very real way, America's military prowess is largely 
the product of its economic success. Given that business to business online sales 
are e:l..'Pected to grow to $1.3 trillion by 2003,64 there is a immense incentive for 
the commercial development of reliable computer security technology for on-
line transactions. 
I believe the tremendous market imperative for secure transactions-and the 
incentive it creates for effective computer security products65_will rapidly out-
strip the resources of individuals or even governments to create methodologies 
capable of circumventing improved defensive measures. In discussing the 
long-term threat after the denial-of-service attacks in early 2000, one commen-
tator maintained that" [w]ith money at stake, e-businesses will fix this glitch. "66 
Overall, I find persuasive Libicki's view that our "enemies best time to conduct 
information warfare has clearly come and gone."67 All of this is yet more evi-
dence that it is unnecessary at the present time to involve the military in 
cyberdefense any more than it is presendy tasked. 
To me, the real danger is not so much that cyberterrorists will use the Web 
as a vehicle for destructive computer network attacks, but rather that they will 
employ it as a convenient source of information useful for a variety of nefarious 
purposes. For example, I am convinced that cyberterrorists could gather 
enough personal information from Web sources to intimidate and harass indi-
viduals or even groups of individuals in the military and elsewhere. This is one 
reason that the DoD has begun to limit the amount ofinformation ~vaila~ 
public sites.68 At least in the near term, however, the damage ha; been done. 
There is sufficient information already on the Internet for those disposed for 
whatever purpose to engage in such crimes as identity theft.69 In fact, I believe 
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this problem is getting so difficult to rectify that in the not too distant future, 
courts will be adjudicating "identity replacement" much as they now do in bank-
ruptcy cases. Still, these cyberthreats are, in my view, properly within the respon-
sibility--and growing capability--oflaw enforcement agencies to resolveJO 
Avoiding the Cyberterrorist Label 
.&; important as it is to defend against cyberattacks, it is equally important to 
ensure that our own security activities avoid accusations that we ourselves are 
engaging in cyberterrorism. In a very real sense, the flip side of cyberterrorism is 
the use of cybertechniques for legitimate offensive IO. From the military perspec-
tive, the means and methods of the cyberterrorist are not necessarily malum itt se; 
rather, they must be tested against existing domestic and international law appli-
cable ante bello as well as in bello. Along this line, in 1999 the Office of the DoD 
General Counsel issued its :first unclassified assessment of the legal aspects of 
information operationsJl In other words, to the military way of thinking, 
cyberterrorism is objectionable because ofits purposes and the '1}antter in which 
it is employed (e.g., against noncombatants and noncombatant objects), not, 
per se, because of the techniques themselves. 
Still, there are many legal and policy questions yet to be resolved. For example, 
what constitutes, in the layman's vernacular, the proverbial "act of war"? That 
is, what measure of peacetime cybermanipulation is tolerable before it amounts to 
a "use offorce" or "armed attack" that plunges a nation into conflict?72 While the 
definitive answer yet eludes us, there is a growing consensus that once the cyber-
assault creates consequences indistinguishable from that of a traditional kinetic 
attack, the legal status of the cyberevent becomes likewise the same.73 Con-
versely, it appears cyberevents that do not reach that threshold would not there-
fore constitute aggression within the meaning of the UN Charter (although they 
may be violative of other aspects of international or domestic law)J4 
Reference to the UN Charter raises the larger issue of the wisdom of various 
suggestions for an international agreement addressing cyberterrorism. Some of 
these, like the Stanford proposal,75 explicidy exclude "activities undertaken by 
military forces of a State party, or State party activities during armed conflict. "76 
Others, like the reported Russian proposal, contemplate banning certain infor-
mation weapons altogether.77 Many would agree that there is a need for greater 
international cooperation to confront the unique issues presented by cyber-
terrorism78 and that cooperation may need to take the form of an international 
agreement. That said, we ought to be cautious about entering into legal regimes 
that may unnecessarily hamper what is, after all, an area where the US, as the 
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world's foremost digital power, may itselfhave an asymmetric advantage across 
the spectrum of conflict. 
To the extent news reports are reliable, the Kosovo conflict raised a number 
of interesting issues about the use of cybertechniques during armed conflict. For 
example, early in the campaign it was reported that a civilian US hacker sent a 
denial-of-service e-mail "bomb" that flooded the Serb Government website 
with 500,000 e-mails, crashing the site.79 Is this person an unlawful combatant 
under international law? Likely. A cyberterrorist? Perhaps. 
Additionally, it was widely reported in the press that senior policymakers did 
not approve a planned cyberassault ofMilosevic's personal bank accounts.80 I do 
not know if such a plan ever existed, let alone the reasons it was not executed.81 
Ifit did exist, however, one can imagine that a key issue would be the propriety 
of striking the private property of a civilian,82 notwithstanding his position as the 
head of State of a belligerent. Given the growing aversion in the international 
community to the use of destructive, kinetic weapons in war that may cause ci-
vilian deaths, it may be useful to re-examine the prohibition against targeting of 
civilian objects via cybertechniques ifbloodshed can be avoided through this 
kind of coercion. John Markoff, writing in the New York Times, argues that 
"cyberwarfare raises a fundamental philosophical question ... the biggest chal-
lenge that such warfare may pose for democratic societies is that it further blurs 
the distinction between military and nonmilitary targets. "83 
There are other complex issues occasioned by emerging cyber capabilities for 
the armed forces of a democracy: In the US military, 10 embraces a wide range 
of technology-empowered activities. Psychological operations, for example, are 
important to the military commander imbued in the Clausewitzean tradition to 
believe that the ability of an adversary to wage war depends upon the support of 
the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the armed forces. 84 
Disassembling the enemy's trinity, that is, undermining his will while preserving 
one's own, is an accepted military objective.85 
Some emerging cybertechniques present exciting opportunities for the mili-
tary professional to sap an enemy's resolve with relatively litde violence.86 As 
Hollywood has repeatedly demonstrated, the ability to use digital means to 
morph or otherwise create extremely convincing-but false-images is now 
\videly available.87 Considering such capabilities, Thomas Czerwinski, then a 
professor at the National Defense University, posed an interesting question: 
"What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein's image, altered it, and pro-
jected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?"88 
Quite obviously, it could deceive a population about its leaders, as Professor 
Czenvinski indicates. 
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Few would call such efforts against a totalitarian or wholly depraved regime 
"cyberten;orism." A different issue arises, I believe, when the hostile govern-
ment is a genuinely democratic one. Consider that if Internet-based vot-
ing-which the US military is experimenting with today89-becomes 
widespread, the potential exists to manipulate elections in enemy countries dur-
ing armed conflict via cybersubversion of the voting process itself 
Would such an operation be appropriate in light of US national security pol-
icy that promotes democracy?90 I do not think so, even though I am not an ad-
herent to the democratic peace theory.91 Based on my own experience in 
Somalia and elsewhere, I find Professor Samuel P. Huntington's" clash of ch>ili-
zations" thesis far more convincing.92 I accept that there are entire societies that 
hold values fundamentally different from our own-and they would freely vote 
to retain those values-even though the policies they produce may lead to con-
flict with the US or other Western nations.93 Nevertheless, I also believe that 
democracy ought not to be asked to "pay for itself," so to speak, by necessarily 
producing peace. 
Democracy as an expression of the principle of self-determination found in the 
UN Charter94 and elsewhere has an intrinsic human value independent of any 
peace-generating quality. Accordingly, is it right to apply cybertechniques 
against an adversary's democratic processes, even in time of war? Certainly it is appro-
priate to act to control the hostile acts of any government, democratic or other-
wise. It seems to me, however, that care must be taken to distinguish between 
the use of cyberweapons to address the actions of a democratic government, and 
employing them to undermine the democratic processes that produced it. 
Michael Walzer, perhaps the premier ethicist on issues of war and peace, gives 
us another matter to consider. He points out that, excluding exceptional cases 
like Nazi Germany, war aims "don't legitimately reach to the transformation of 
the internal politics of the aggressor state or the replacement of its regime. "95 In 
other words, we must be very cautious in employing advanced digital method-
ologies that may destroy the confidence of people in democratic processes. 
Consider also the other vital part of the Clausewitzean trinity: maintaining 
the will of the publics ofJriendly countries.96 This is especially a concern for dem-
ocratic countries, and it was raised during the Kosovo operation. You may recall 
that Serb radio and television stations were bombed in attacks highly criticized 
by Human Rights Watch97 and others.98 In my opinion, the attacks were 
warranted99 since it appears that the facilities were used to whip up ethnic hatred 
for years.100 As Air Commodore David Wilby, a NATO spokesman, eA-plained 
on April 8, 1999, "Serb radio and TV is an instrument of propaganda and re-
pression .... It is ... a legitimate target in this campaign." 101 Since, inter alia, 
364 
Charles J. Dunlap 
incitement to genocide may itselfbe a war crime,102 Wilby's assertions seem to 
have merit, assuming the other prerequisites of the law of armed conflict were 
met. 
If cybertechniques can neutralize the facilities without the physical destruc-
tion conventional munitions cause, we should embrace netwar as a develop-
ment that could reduce the misery of war. Suppose, however, that the enemy 
radio and television stations were transmitting not propaganda, per se, but accu-
rate information about US operations that nevertheless was eroding support 
among our public or that of allied democracies?103 For example, in a report on 
the attacks on Serb television stations, Patrick L. Sloyan observed that while 
bombing stopped the "diet of lies fed Serb viewers," it also served to "curb 
transmission to the West of those disturbing 'collateral damage' pictures that 
could erode public support for NATO's escalating strikes in the Balkans."104 If 
addressing the latter concern were the sole aim--as opposed to, for example, the 
limited notion of preserving operational security in a particular circum-
stance--would the attacks be justified? Probably not. 
Censorship and exclusion of the press from military operations has long been tol-
erated in liberal democracies during wartime. lOS Essentially, where there is a dem-
onstration that the information would present a clear and present danger to national 
security, it could be suppressed.106 That concept, however, would not seem to per-
mit the suppression of news reports-via cyberassault or other means--simply be-
cause the information conveyed would tend to demoralize public opinion in our 
own country, or that of our allies. Democracy, I believe, has its price. 
Concluding Observations 
If this brief survey has succeeded, the reader will appreciate that the issues 
raised by cyberterrorism are many and complex. At the present time, law and 
policy carefully circumscribe the military's role, and to date DoD has been care-
ful to stay ,vithin those limits.107 There are, however, calls for expanded respon-
sibility. Some suggest a relaxation of the policy that presumes atleastinitially that 
a cyberattack is a civilian law enforcement problem, not a national security is-
sue.10S Doing so, it is contended, would allow that application of the consider-
able resources of the military and intelligence communities that currendy are 
barred from use in most domestic cases involving US persons.109 
To this end, one innovative proposal calls for a policy that presumes the digi-
tal "intruder is not a US person," thus permitting "the full capabilities of the 
United States' investigative and intelligence assets" to be brought to bear.ll0 
However, this reversal of the present presumption would apply only to attacks 
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against specified systems that are deemed by statute to be critical to the nation's 
economic and national security interests.111 Whether such an approach is politi-
cally feasible depends upon public perceptions. As already indicated, what role, 
if any, the military should play in defending against domestic cyberattacks is em-
bedded in the larger issue regarding the extent to which Americans believe their 
way of life is put at risk by the potential of cyberterrorism. 
In this regard, I would add one final note of caution. I have often heard a vari-
ety of senior Pentagon 112 and national security officialsl13 insist that the US is 
susceptible to an "electronic Pearl Harbor." Conjuring up emotional images of 
the infamous sneak attack that pulled the US into World War II is certainly an ef-
fective way to hype the interest of persons both in and out of uniform towards 
greater vigilance and preparedness. The analogy is one plainly worth pondering, 
especially as our society becomes increasingly digitally dependent. 
There is, however, a very dark side of the Pearl Harbor story that we should 
also keep in mind. As a result of the fears generated, the US military-acting in a 
domestic security role-rounded up thousands ofloyal American citizens and 
placed them in detention camps, all in the name of responding to a threat to na-
tional security. We know today that the sacrifice of the rights of Japa-
nese-Americans was wholly unnecessary. Although it may be fashionable these 
days to say that the roundups were simply racism run amok, those that have actu-
ally read Korematsu v. United States, 114 as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist's discus-
sion in his recent bookl15 may conclude otherwise. From those sources one can 
reasonably conclude that principled men struggling with a real fear of invasion 
by an enemy who had already demonstrated his treachery at Pearl Harbor made 
what they sincerely believed was a unavoidable decision-however wrong-
headed it appears with the benefit of hindsight. 
But, in a sense, the fact that respectable people were nevertheless responsible 
for the treatment of Japanese-Americans that we now find so objectionable 
should itself give us pause. As we consider the growing involvement of the mili-
tary in countering cyberterrorism, we must never forget that the armed forces is 
the least democratic and most unapologetically authoritarian element of our so-
ciety. I hasten to add that this does not presume anything sinister about those in 
uniform or those that advocate an enhanced role for the military in fighting 
cyberterrorism. I merely submit that in a democracy, and especially American 
democracy, the machinations of the truly evil are, somewhat paradoxically, fre-
quently more readily corrected than are the misdirected efforts of well-
intentioned, honorable citizens. 
Pearl Harbor and the sacrifices that followed in its aftermath remain a lesson 
for us as we consider what role, if any, the military should play in countering 
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cyberterrorism. On a deeper level we must accept that perfect security is funda-
mentally at odds with democratic values. This applies as much to cyberterrorism 
as to any other threat against us. We must be prepared to take prudent risks in or-
der to have a free society. The inescapable truth is that we must likewise ac-
knowledge that from time to time our freedom will exact a harsh price from us 
and those we love. 
Nevertheless, we must not allow the dread of digital terror to drive us to take 
counsel of our fears. As Martin Van Creveld and others have pointed out, terror-
ism has not succeeded in developed States because it is a characteristic of moder-
nity to have a robust level of technological redundancy and political resiliency so 
as to make individual terrorist attacks relatively futile in terms of real effect on ca-
pability.116 While cyberterrorists might be able to inflict costly losses periodi-
cally, they cannot physically imperil our continued existence as a free nation. 
Indeed, the real risk is upon those who challenge the forces offreedom. As Pro-
fessor Victor Hanson explains in his book, Soul of Battle, 117 history shows that the 
forces of democracies once aroused are extraordinarily fearsome combatants who, 
nOt\vithstanding the seeming empowering militarism of the opposing forces, 
tend to not merely defeat the armies of despots, but to pulverize them and every-
thing that supports them. So profound is such defeat that the very societies that pro-
duced the forces of tyranny are left fundamentally changed and virtually 
unrecognizable to their former masters. The enemies of democracies ought to 
take note. 
In summary, the true threat is not what damage cyberterrorists can inflict 
upon our digital systems, but what freedoms they can force us to forfeit. The San 
Francisco Chronicle, citing a report by the Commission on National Security121st 
Century,118 editorialized that "terrorist hackers" and other threats "will proba-
bly put pressure on the military to move into domestic law enforcement, blur-
ring the line bet\veen domestic and foreign threats."119 It soberly warned "it is 
better to live \vith danger than in the security of a police State. "120 Although we 
are certainly not yet living in the shadow of a police State, it is a timely reminder 
of what is really at stake. 
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